A Year With George Washington
On February 19, 1778, General Washington wrote to Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia from Valley Forge, dreading the prospect of mutiny.
In a manner typical of Washington, he enumerated for Henry to judge for himself the possible reasons for the “deplorable” state of the army, though he well knew the proximate causes.
Another trait inherent in Washington’s nature was that he almost invariably accepted things as they were, rather than deceiving himself into thinking otherwise. In short, he had a remarkable ability to strip a situation down to its most truthful elements and tackle the problem at its root.
The three men most hostile to Washington’s command were also those whose duty it was to supply his starving soldiers. In the letter to Henry, Washington succinctly offered clues as to the source of his and his army’s misery without saying it directly.
To what causes, this is to be attributed; whether to an ill-timed and too general revolution in the department in the midst of a campaign,
Here, Washington is referring to the newly constituted Congressional Board of War. He had earlier suggested the formation of the body to coordinate the army’s supply, which the Congress ultimately did, but rather than staffing it with competent officers, they packed it with men openly hostile to Washington, and who sought his removal.
Appointed to the Board were officers who heretofore were inferior to Washington in rank, but, now, no longer answered to him. They included General Horatio Gates, who believed he, rather than Washington, deserved to be Commander-in-Chief; General Thomas Mifflin, Washington’s former aide de camp and now Quartermaster of the Army; and General Thomas Conway, who had recently been promoted by Congress against Washington’s advice and who was actively organizing a campaign against him to discredit him. The group of conspirators was known as the “Conway Cabal,” and now made up the bulk of the Board
Washington continued with another possibility as to why his army was being ill-treated.
…to its being placed in improper, hands…
Washington was referring to the persistent rumors that Board of War Member and Quartermaster Thomas Mifflin was diverting supplies meant for Valley Forge and instead stockpiling them before selling them to the highest bidder for his own personal gain. He continued…
…or to a diminution of resources, and increased difficulties in the means of procuring, or to a combination of all these circumstances; I shall not undertake to decide.
Washington believed that supplies were there to be had, but efforts to acquire and transport them to the army were not rigorous enough to produce the needed results.
As Congress and the Board of War were proving ineffectual in supplying his sick, freezing, and starving army, Washington, in desperation, sidestepped them and sought relief from the states. Below is the letter he sent to Virginia Governor Patrick Henry.
To Patrick Henry
Head Quarters Valley Forge February 19 1778
Sir,
The melancholy prospect before us, with respect to supplies of provisions induces me, reluctantly to trouble you on a subject which does not naturally fall within the circle of your attention.
The situation of the Commissary’s department and of the army, in consequence, is more deplorable, than you can easily imagine. We have frequently suffered temporary want and great inconveniences, and for several days past we have experienced little less than a famine in camp, and have had much cause to dread a general mutiny and dispersion; Our future prospects are, if possible still worse: The magazines laid up, as far as my information reaches, are insignificant, totally incompetent to our necessities; and from every appearance, there has been heretofore so astonishing a deficiency in providing, that unless the most vigorous and effectual measures are at once, every where adopted, the language is not too strong to declare that we shall not be able to make another campaign.
To what causes, this is to be attributed; whether to an ill-timed and too general revolution in the department in the midst of a campaign, to its being placed in improper, hands or to a diminution of resources, and increased difficulties in the means of procuring, or to a combination of all these circumstances; I shall not undertake to decide. We have to lament, that our affairs are so situated, and it is incumbent upon us to employ our utmost efforts to ward off the ruin such a situation of things threatens. We have it in our power to do it, but our greatest activity and the fullest exertion of our resources, are requisite.
I am earnestly requesting the aid of the executive authority of those states, whence our supplies are drawn; and in persuance of this intention, I address myself to you; convinced that our alarming distresses will engage your most serious consideration; and that the full force of that zeal and vigor, you have manifested upon every other occasion, will now operate for our relief, in a matter that so nearly affects the very existence of our contest. What methods you have it in your power to embrace for this purpose, your own judgment will best suggest; the substance of my present request, is that you will contribute your assistance to turng all the supplies your state can afford, more than are sufficient for the subsistence of its inhabitants, into a channel of supplies for the army, in such way as will appear to you most effectual; and at the same time to forwarding the means of transportation, from a defect in which we suffer great embarrassments.
I am duly honored with your favour of the 28th of last month. The method, of paying the additional state Bounty that appears to me most eligible is that of sending the money to camp, with a temporary paymaster, to be issued on warrants from me agreeable to muster rolls and abstracts, authenticated in the same manner as practiced in other cases. Any other mode, however, that may be deemed more convenient, will be perfectly agreeable to me.
I submit it to consideration, whether it might not be advisable for your Excellency, to issue a notification to those soldiers, who have been reinlisted and permitted to go home on furlough, that on their return to camp, they will receive the additional bounty, as prescribed by the act of assembly. As most of them engaged, before the Act took place or was announced, the bounty may be put upon the footing of a reward for past services. This notification may have an influence in making them more faithful and punctual in returning to camp at the expiration of their furloughs.
