A Year With George Washington
On February 12, 1781, General Washington received news of Brigadier General Daniel Morgan’s smashing victory at Cowpens, South Carolina.
Former Quaker Major General Nathanael Greene, Washington’s loyal and capable right-hand man, took over as commander of the southern army in December 1780. Greene succeeded Major General Horatio Gates, who had failed miserably in his attempt to oust the British from the south and had, in fact, lost every major engagement since assuming the post.
For their part, the British had switched their war strategy from the static northern theater to the south and had newly met with success. Both Savannah and Charleston had fallen, as had Augusta and other rebel strongholds in South Carolina.
Having relieved Gates at Charlotte, North Carolina, Greene took the highly unusual step of splitting his army in two. Age-old military doctrine held that a commander should never do so when outnumbered by the enemy. But his experience as Quartermaster of the Army led him to conclude that local resources were insufficient to sustain his large force. Moreover, Smallpox had broken out in his camp, and bifurcating the army was the only expedient way of containing its spread.
British General Cornwallis, with his larger force, split his own, dispatching the hated and feared twenty-six-year-old Colonel Banastre Tarleton with roughly 1100 men to hunt down and destroy Morgan and his army.
Fearing that he might become trapped between Tarleton and Cornwallis, and needing more time to assemble his force from the surrounding backcountry, Morgan retreated to the northwest toward a place at a bend in the Broad River called Cowpens near the North Carolina border. Cowpens was so-named because it was a staging ground for cattle to graze on the way to market. Ranchers would either temporarily graze their herd there and continue on, or sell the cattle to others who would drive them to the coastal markets.
General Morgan chose the open, gently rolling, freshly grazed field because it would allow his army to better maneuver, particularly his light cavalry, which he did not want hindered by underbrush. Morgan’s order of battle required pre-planned, swift movements. The Cowpens was thus ideal.
As Morgan retreated up country to Cowpens, Tarleton, expecting an easy triumph over Morgan’s unseasoned militia, hurried his pace and quickly closed the distance. This augured well for Morgan in two ways. One, Tarleton’s army would be near exhausted from the march when it met his on the battlefield, and two, Cornwallis’s main army, not keeping pace with Tarleton’s, would be a two-day march away and thus could not render aid to Tarleton should he need it.
Tarleton thought he had the upper hand as the “rebels” were backed up against the swollen Broad River. Even on horseback, however, he could not see the array of Morgan’s army through the small but undulating slopes. His confidence was further buoyed by his part in the victories at the battles of Waxhaws and Camden. At Waxhaws, Tarleton had been tagged (fairly or not) with the moniker “Tarleton’s Quarter.” The derogatory term meant that a surrendering soldier would be granted no quarter but would be shot, instead. The Battle of Waxhaws, or the Waxhaw Massacre as it was called, had been fought the previous spring, and word of Tarleton’s villainy had spread.
Morgan knew Tarleton held his army in contempt, believing it would run from the enemy at the first sign of danger. At Camden, Tarleton had sprung upon the American Continentals from behind and chased the terrified soldiers for twenty miles, taking many prisoners and nearly all their supply wagons.
Daniel Morgan, with his combined force of roughly 1050 men consisting of Continental Regulars, sharpshooters, militia, and Dragoons, lured the British to “Hannah’s Cowpens” near the Broad River. His plan was to place a small contingent of sharpshooters from Georgia and North and South Carolina at the front, followed by his inexperienced militia. His main force of Continentals would be out of view behind a slight ridge, and his Dragoons would bring up the rear.
Tarleton had at his disposal a British Legion made up of a mix of cavalry and infantry, the 17th Light Dragoons, a two “grasshopper” cannon battery of Royal Artillery, Royal Fusilliers (the 7th Regiment of Foot), the 16th Regiment of Foot (Light Infantry), Frasers Highlanders (71st Regiment of Foot), and the Prince of Wales Regiment of American Loyalists. Tarleton was also aided by American Loyalist guides. Tarleton’s combined force numbered just under 1100 men.
While the American sharpshooters at the fore were not professional soldiers, they had fought many a skirmish on the frontier. The sharpshooters were to slow the advance by picking off enemy officers, then retreat in a fast but orderly manner through the militia lines and reassemble at their flanks.
The militia, roughly 150 yards behind the sharpshooters and composed of volunteers from the neighboring states as well as Virginia, was commanded by Colonel Andrew Pickens. Morgan had spent the entire night before trying to put Picken’s men at ease by joking around and reassuring them that they would only need to fire three rounds (though each man was issued twenty-four) for them to earn the kisses of their wives and sweethearts. One soldier stated that he never went to bed.
Tartleton, eager for victory, took to the field from the woods just before sunrise, having just marched his men for four hours straight with no food and little sleep. As instructed, Morgan’s sharpshooters fired on the advancing Dragoons, killing or wounding fifteen of them, and then, hurriedly retreating, continued to fire as they moved to either flank of the Pickens Militia.
Tarleton was none the wiser to the deception and gave chase to the retreating Americans, not bothering to wait for his troops, who were still exiting the woods. Morgan used the young colonel’s disdain and hubris to his advantage by deliberately instructing his less experienced militia to fire twice and then also execute an orderly retreat. They did as Morgan had instructed, and Tarleton, with his army temporarily dazed but reorganised, and believing his foe in a panicked retreat, moved in for the final stroke. But his view was obstructed by the sloop, and he was thus unaware that his pursuing dragoons and infantry were heading into the teeth of the main Continental force.
Hidden just over the downside of the ridge were Lt. Colonel John Howard’s Continentals. They were hardened troops, consisting of the Delaware Line, a company of Virginians, and three companies of the indomitable Maryland Line, already famous in the war for their courage in the face of the enemy.
Thus far, everything had gone according to Morgan’s plan, but as the 71st Highlanders, with bagpipes wailing, attempted to turn the Continental’s right flank, Howard, seeing the movement, ordered his men to stem the advance. The order was somehow misinterpreted, however, and his right flank, rather than engaging the Highlanders, began to pull back. This, ironically, may have contributed to Morgan’s ruse, as Tarleton, despite his surprise, continued in his rabid pursuit. The resulting chase caused the Tarleton’s army to break formation.
Morgan, seeing the mistake, quickly halted the Continentals and ordered a volley. His men promptly turned about face and startled the exhausted Redcoats, who had been running and fighting pell-mell now for forty-five minutes. From just 30 yards away, the Continentals fired at the British to devastating effect, halting their advance. Those that survived the volley were stunned to behold something rarely seen by an American army – A bayonet charge!
Most of Tarleton’s men either surrendered where they stood or dropped their weapons and ran. With their bayonets gleaming in the morning light, Howard’s men pushed forward and seized the two grasshopper cannon.
Morgan’s Continental Dragoons made up the rear and were thus far held in reserve. They were under the command of Lt. Colonel William Washington, cousin to George Washington and a veteran of the Battles of Trenton, where he was severely wounded. He had also fought at Harlem Heights, Monck’s Corner, and a half-dozen other engagements. Morgan gave the go-ahead order to Washington, who turned his Dragoons loose.
Colonel Washington’s Cavalry thundered in from behind Howard’s left flank and hit the British on their right and rear. Picken’s Militia re-emerged, newly reconstituted, and encircled the 71st Highlanders, who were the only British forces still engaged in the fight.
Tarleton, meanwhile, dashed back to his lines and ordered his last remaining troops, the British Legion, to enter the fray. Keenly aware of the impending defeat, most of them refused the command and flew into the woods. The brash commander managed to corral three dozen or so of the Legion and ordered them to retake the two cannon. They failed in their attempt and retreated while the overwhelmed Highlanders surrendered.
Washington’s cavalry pursued Tarlton and his mounted Legion as they poured into the surrounding forest. Legend has it that he and Tarleton met on the battlefield and fought a “duel” of swords and pistols, before Tarleton escaped. Whether the story is apocryphal or not, Tarleton left the field totally humiliated and defeated. Of the 1076 men under Tarleton’s command at Cowpens, 115 were killed, and 830 were captured; nearly a quarter of whom were wounded.
The Battle of Cowpens turned the tide of the long war for independence in favor of the Americans. The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Clinton, would later describe it as the beginning of the end for the British dominion over America.
For his part, Daniel Morgan had yet again performed a tactical masterpiece and bested his British counterpart. Washington considered him to be one of his two best field commanders of the war. The other being the tenacious but recently disgraced Benedict Arnold.
The battle of Cowpens hastened the end of British presence in the south and led to General Lord Cornwallis’s surrender ten months later at Yorktown. General Daniel Morgan’s battlefield brilliance is still marveled at today.
